Metanexus: Views 2002.04.11 3718 words What is ethics? What is morality? In the last week or two, we have been looking at some of the ethical and political dilemmas created by, or influenced by, the science religion debate. It seems that, commonly, the underlying idea behind ethics and morality is, quoting Spike Lee, to "do the right thing." But how does one know what that right thing is? Today, columnist Bonnie Talbert takes a look at Michael Ruse's evolutionary view of ethics and morality, while pondering that very question. "According to Ruse's naturalistic account of ethics," writes Talbert, "morality is just an illusion created by our genes to make us believe that our biological instincts are objectively good. But if this were true, and normative ethics was false (objectively speaking), then why would one want to be moral? If morality emerges from our genetic endowment toward socialization for the sake of survival, then why would anyone care about what one ought to do? Ruse uses biology to take normativity completely out of ethics. Ruse claims that ethics should be examined from a completely descriptive point of view. He avoids the is/ought problem - he simply eliminates the "ought" and claimed that all that exists is "is." Why would one adhere to a morality that is a genetic illusion - a morality that is not morality at all? If morality is false, then why be moral?" Ah, yes, the unanswered (or, at least, never sufficiently answered) question that lies in the backs of our minds ever since we were each of us that four-year old who really did want those chocolate chip cookies BEFORE dinner: why be good? Why put a parent's silly desire about the order in which food is consumed over my own personal desire to have a little culinary enjoyment? Why be moral? Talbert goes on to observe that like "the emotivist, Ruse thinks that morality is an emotion, that it is ultimately a question of feelings (...). But unlike the emotivist, Ruse claims that, '...the meaning of morality is that it is objective' (...). That is, morality itself is not objective (i.e., it has no independent existence), but the meaning of morality is. Ruse endorses a neo-Humean approach to ethics: he claims (as Hume did) that ethics is no more than a subjective phenomenon, but at the same time, refuses to concede moral relativism. Furthermore, Ruse claims, 'Hume, like me, sees morality as being a differential phenomenon, weakening as one moves away from one's family and friends. But most crucially, Hume is my mentor because he went before me in trying to provide a completely naturalistic theory of ethics (...)." Now, here is where I become confused, as the discussion would lead one to believe that ethics and morality are somehow either interchangeable phenomena or, at the very least, interchangeably concepts. But are they? And even though one can point out, via a lovely cascade of etymological arguments, that both words essentially do mean "habit" (of all things!) in their original languages (Greek for ethics; Latin for morals), despite certain differences in voice and plurality, one also has to admit that there is a subtle difference in their use in contemporary English. For just as one can say that action X may be legal, but it is not moral, so one also hears that while action Y is ethical, it is not really moral. And what, I ask, is meant by that? Originally from Lumberton, TX, Bonnie Talbert is currently a senior philosophy and political science major at Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, TX. Her interests are in political philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology and ethics. -- Stacey E. Ake =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Subject: What an Evolutionary Account of Ethics Fails to Explain From: Bonnie Talbert Email: The beginning of the Enlightenment marked the beginning of an ideological movement to explain everything scientifically. And in the 21st century, scientific explanations have also entered the realm of ethics, despite well-known fallacies associated with purely scientific explanations of ethics such as the is/ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy. Still, many sociobiologists and philosophers, such as Michael Ruse (who is both), are attempting to give a scientific explanation for ethics that asserts that ethics is a product of evolution. While Ruse's account of ethics corresponds with current trends to explain diverse phenomena scientifically, his theory leaves no reason for one to be moral, his biological accounts of ethics are inconsistent with the actual ethical codes to which most people subscribe, and his interpretation of ethics does not meet the biological qualifications necessary to be considered an evolutionary adaptation. In order to explicate my critique of evolutionary ethics as advocated by Ruse, I must first offer a brief summary of his account of ethics. In "Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach," Michael Ruse claims to have explained the relationship between ethics and evolution, while avoiding the is/ought barrier. He claims that ethics exists as a product of evolution: "We have certain built-in strategies, hard-wired into our brains if you like, which we bring into play and which guide our actions when we are faced with certain social situations" (119). Thus, like long necks that help giraffes reach higher food, ethics is an evolutionary adaptation that aids survival in certain species. Ruse explains that human cooperation is a good biological strategy: "a very important part of human evolution involved staying together in bands" ("Significance" 503). Ruse asserts that there is good reason to believe that having an ethical sense is one of the main factors that allowed humans to work together. Those who had such ethical sense worked together more successfully, lived longer, and reproduced more often. Thus, "altruism", or an "ethical sense" became a human adaptation that helped the species work together, which aided human survival. So, since ethics is contingent on the processes of evolution, Ruse claims that there are no metaethical foundations for normative ethics. He calls his position a version of ethical skepticism -- that is, skepticism with respect to the metaethical foundations of morality, not with respect to normative ethical claims (i.e. claims such as "murder is wrong" or "altruism is good"). Although Ruse explains morality as a biological construct, his view is not deterministic. Ruse claims, "Moral choice comes into whether we obey the rules of morality, not whether we choose the rules themselves. We are not free to decide whether killing is wrong or not. It is wrong! The freedom comes in deciding if we are going to kill nevertheless" ("Evolution" 125). Ruse asserts that beliefs about morality are biological constructs, but unlike ants, we are not biologically determined to act according to our biological interests. Murder is wrong in the biological sense (it is contrary to our biological self-interest in most cases, for it hinders survival and reproduction of one's species), but we are still free to commit murder. But, if we believe murder is immoral, we are much less likely to do so.[1] Ruse explains that nature made humans altruists in the literal/moral sense to help make us "altruists" in the biological sense. Ruse claims, "...to make us co-operators, to make us 'altruists', nature has filled us full of thoughts about the need to co-operate" ("Significance" 503). That is, not only does evolution equip us with tendencies toward certain "altruistic acts" (in the biological sense), but evolution also leads us to objectify such acts as being altruistic in the moral sense. For example, helping those to whom we are most closely related makes "altruistic" sense, for they are likely to share part of our genetic code. That is, helping my brother makes more biological sense than does helping a stranger because my brother shares a larger proportion of my genetic code than a stranger does. The purpose of evolution is to ensure the survival and reproduction of one's genes, so it would make biological sense to help my brother since helping him would most likely help promote my genetic legacy. Also, Ruse asserts that we will perform "altruistic" acts more readily if we believe they are altruistic. So, according to Ruse, evolution has led us to believe that "altruistic" acts are objectively moral in the altruistic sense because believing so is in our biological interest. In short, Ruse claims that "Morality is no more than a collective illusion fobbed off on us by our genes for reproductive ends" ("Significance" 506). Like the emotivist, Ruse thinks that morality is an emotion, that it is ultimately a question of feelings (E-mail). But unlike the emotivist, Ruse claims that, "...the meaning of morality is that it is objective" ("Evolution" 126). That is, morality itself is not objective (i.e., it has no independent existence), but the meaning of morality is. Ruse endorses a neo-Humean approach to ethics: he claims (as Hume did) that ethics is no more than a subjective phenomenon, but at the same time, refuses to concede moral relativism. Furthermore, Ruse claims, "Hume, like me, sees morality as being a differential phenomenon, weakening as one moves away from one's family and friends. But most crucially, Hume is my mentor because he went before me in trying to provide a completely naturalistic theory of ethics" ("Evolution" 127). According to Ruse's naturalistic account of ethics, morality is just an illusion created by our genes to make us believe that our biological instincts are objectively good. But if this were true, and normative ethics was false (objectively speaking), then why would one want to be moral? If morality emerges from our genetic endowment toward socialization for the sake of survival, then why would anyone care about what one ought to do? Ruse uses biology to take normativity completely out of ethics. Ruse claims that ethics should be examined from a completely descriptive point of view. He avoids the is/ought problem - he simply eliminates the "ought" and claimed that all that exists is "is." Why would one adhere to a morality that is a genetic illusion - a morality that is not morality at all? If morality is false, then why be moral? In "Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique," Peter Woolcock explains that as soon as one accepts Ruse's position, he/she would have no reason to act contrary to his/her own wishes even if it harms others as long as he/she can successfully avoid punishment. In short, one would only act morally as long as he/she remains ignorant of Ruse's theory. Consider the following example: everyone in a small society gathers their own food, and thinks it is wrong to steal food from others. Suppose a young teenager discovers Ruse's theory, and at the same time finds himself with the chance to steal food without being detected. Not only would it be in the teen's genetic interest to steal, but if the youngster adheres to the theory that morality is an illusion, why wouldn't he steal when it is clearly in his own self-interest to do so as long as he can avoid punishment? Once one accepts Ruse's arguments, "All that [he]/she will be left with as conscious reasons for actions will be [his]/her own wants, inclinations, preferences, feelings, etc. which may or may not coincide with what morality requires" (Woolcock 424). Ruse's position leaves no reason for one to act in any other way than that which is in one's genetic interest; thus biology, not morality determines what one should do according to Ruse's assertions. Furthermore, ethical claims based on evolutionary assumptions would often be opposed to those of many ethical systems to which most people currently subscribe. One of the most common ethical assumptions, utilitarianism, embodies several claims that would not correspond with an evolutionary type of ethics. One of the basic premises of utilitarianism is the principle of equal consideration: that no one person's pain/pleasure counts more that anyone else's. But, if ethics were based on evolutionary principles, this would not be true; it would be in our genetic interest to count ourselves and those most closely connected to us (those who likely share a large part of our genetic code, or whose friendship benefits us) as being more important.[2] An evolutionary ethicist would say that one has a stronger moral obligation to one's fellow countryman than to someone halfway around the world; utilitarianism would claim that one has an equal obligation to both.[3] Utilitarianism also claims that one would be morally obligated to sacrifice one's own self-interest in situations when that act would produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people - something that an evolutionary ethic would not prescribe. Clearly, common ethical codes often prohibit acts that are in one's genetic interest. And if ethics were only a genetic illusion as Ruse claims, why would our genes trick us into objectifying a moral system that often worked against our genetic advantage? It seems highly unlikely that they would. In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin claims that "as the reasoning powers and foresight... became improved, each man would soon learn from experience that if he aided his fellow man, he would commonly receive aid in return" (163-164). In this passage, Darwin refers to a concept known as reciprocal altruism - the notion that people are altruistic only when they expect to get something in return. Reciprocal altruism undoubtedly aided survival in humans' ancestral environment - if I get the nuts and you get the berries and we share what we gather, we will both be better off. In this manner, reciprocal altruism leaves both parties better off than they were before. Robert Wright explains that in some situations, exploitation is a much better tactic to maximize genetic fitness that reciprocal altruism: "People sometimes lie, cheat or steal...and they may behave this way even toward people who are nice to them. What's more: people sometimes prosper in this fashion. That we have this capacity for exploiting, and that it sometimes pays off, suggests that there have been times during evolution when being nice to nice people wasn't the genetically optimal strategy" (215). For example, if, I gather the nuts and you gather the berries, if I can convince you to give me part of your share under the guise that I will reciprocate, then I will be better off - I will have more food and not have to give you any. That is, it is certainly in our genetic interest to appear to be reciprocal altruists, but it may not be in our interest to live up to our reciprocal guise if one can benefit more via exploitation. Again, this evolutionary claim seems contrary to what many plausible ethical theories would prescribe. Any Kantian ethicist would first deny reciprocal altruism because it seems to be a consequentialist claim - one only helps if there is likely to be a reward. Kant's ethics is without a doubt non-consequentialistic: what one should do in no way depends on the consequences of that act. The Categorical Imperative commands that one act only according to that maxim by which he/she can at the same time will that should become universal law. Kant claims that one of the commands of the Categorical Imperative is that individuals help others in need. Kant thinks it would be impossible for one to will that one should not help another in need, for when one wills that he not help another, he is also willing that another not help him, which according to Kant, is a contradiction in will. Thus, a Kantian deontological ethics would never say that one should help another only when he/she expects something in return; Kant's ethics asserts that each person has an unqualified obligation to help another in need regardless of what that person will receive in return.[4] Ruse claims that normative ethics is a biological adaptation and that "We believe normative ethics for our own (biological) good, and that is that." He also states, "There are very good reasons why we believe in normative ethics.... We need it for 'altruism'"("Evolution" 124). But, how can his claim possibly be true when the most popular ethical theories do not direct people to perform those acts that serve one's biological interest. In fact, several theories -- I mentioned utilitarianism and Kantianism -- command one to perform certain acts even if they are contrary to one's biological interest. Of course, I am not implying that Ruse thinks we are genetically programmed to develop certain ethical theories. But such theories are examples of ways that we objectify and justify right and wrong, and Ruse claims that such objectification is a genetic illusion, an evolutionary adaptation that reinforces out biological interests. But would an evolutionary adaptation be one that could work against one's biological interests? Surely not -- it is a well-known fact that evolutionary adaptations are adaptations that promote a species' biological interests. And since normative ethics does not seek to promote one's biological interests, it clearly does not meet the necessary qualifications to be considered an evolutionary adaptation (and when it does, it is only by accident; people do not construct ethics to correlate with biological interests). There is no question that evolution plays some role in ethics: evolution is a necessary condition for ethics, as for any human activity. But evolutionary theory is not sufficient to explain ethics. Sure, evolution may have endowed humans with basic emotions such as love, guilt, and sympathy. Evolution could also explain human events such as reciprocal altruism. But, evolution cannot explain utilitarianism, or Kantianism, or virtue ethics, or any other type of highly cognitive ethical system. Likewise, evolution could have constructed humans with the ability to acquire language; but it would be absurd to claim that evolution sufficiently explains Shakespeare's work. Shakespeare certainly used language, and language is an evolutionary construct. But, the only types of language that evolution can explain are the types of language that would have helped humans survive in a hunter-gatherer society. Thus, evolution can explain language as a basic form of communication, but not as Othello. In the same way, evolution might be able to explain basic human instinctual feelings such as love, guilt, and jealousy, but evolution cannot explain ethics. All evolutionary adaptations are present for a particular reason. Humans are the way they are now because our design maximized fitness in a hunter-gatherer society. These societies participated in activities such as finding a mate, avoiding incest, interpreting facial expressions, cooperation, etc. Such tasks were necessary for survival, and all evolutionary adaptations helped survival in this environment: "Our evolved mechanisms were constructed and adjusted in response to the statistical composite of situations actually encountered by our species during its evolutionary history. These mechanisms were not designed to deal with modern circumstances that are evolutionarily unprecedented" (Cosmides and Tooby 524). Clearly, reciprocal altruism would have been beneficial for survival. But would ethics? How would virtue ethics, utilitarianism, or any other justification of right and wrong help a group of hunter-gatherers get food, or divide up certain tasks? Well, it would not, such theories have been developed within the last two thousand years or so (evolution works in a time frame of hundreds of thousands of years) and were developed to address problems in that same time, which is another reason why evolution cannot explain ethics. Ethics is not a necessary adaptation that aided survival in humans' ancestral environment; therefore, they cannot be an evolutionary construct. There are clearly several objections to Ruse's position. But Ruse would claim that all such objections are actually strengthening his argument. Ruse thinks that we are genetically disposed to believe that morality is not an illusion; thus we cannot help but oppose his views: "Just as the Freudian argues that those who deny his or her explanation thereby confirm it, so the evolutionist argues that those who find his or her explanation implausible support the very point which is being made!" ("Significance" 508). Ruse would claim that my objections to his theory are evidence that I too have been fooled by my genes into thinking that morality is objective and that it is not an illusion. To my objections, Ruse would reply, "Your genes are a lot stronger than my words. The truth does not always set you free" ("Evolution" 126). But by arguing that objections to his theory are really supporting it, Ruse assumes that there can be no real objections to his position, and this simply begs the question (Wertz). Notes: 1 For more on Ruse's view and determinism, see "Evolution and Ethics," page 118. 2 Of course, there are people such as Mother Theresa who seem to instinctually want to help others half way around the world, with nothing promised in return. An evolutionary ethicist would simply explain this type of behavior as a deviation from the norm. Evolutionary explanations deal with broad similarities across time and cultures, so individual and extraordinary cases do not pose a problem for the evolutionist. 3 This is discussed in Peter Singer's article "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." 4 While the average person is not a Kantian per se (most probably do not know who Kant is), most people do adhere to the general principles of Kantianism. For example, those of the Christian faith believe that one should help another in need, regardless of whether that person will ever be able to return the favor (Hestir). Bibliography Cosmides, Leda and Tooby, John. "Origins of Domain Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organization." Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. Ed. L.A. Hirschfeld and S.A. Gelman. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. Facsimilie ed. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981. Hestir, Blake. E-mail. 17 May 2001. Ruse, Michael. "Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach." Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 3rd ed. Ed. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998. ---. E-mail from the author. 25 May 2001. ---. "The Significance of Evolution." The Ethics Text: A Companion to Ethics. Ed. Peter Singer. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991. Singer, Peter. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 1, no. 3. Princeton: Princeton U, 1972. Wertz, Spencer. Written comments on earlier draft of this paper. May 2001. Woolcock, Peter. "Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique." Biology and Philosophy 8 (1993): 423-39. Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Random House, Inc., 1994. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This publication is hosted by Metanexus: The Online Forum on Religion and Science . The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of Metanexus or its sponsors. 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